Abstract: We present a model of N-player contracting with transaction costs and endogenous property rights. Ex ante agreed surplus sharing can be altered ex post, after irreversible investments in production (characterised by the generalised Cobb-Douglas production function). The actual surplus sharing is determined ex post, after each player has chosen a costly action to alter the surplus sharing in his favour, thus incurring transaction costs. We demonstrate that when one player chooses the ex ante contract, each player's equilibrium share increases in his productivity and transaction cost parameters. We contrast our model with property rights theory (PRT) where ex ante contracts are not enforceable ex post.
Introduction
This paper studies contracting between multiple players (firms) who produce jointly and thereafter share the surplus of joint production. In today's global economy multi-player production is widespread. The omnipresent internet further reinforces the need and the use of N-player contracting, which becomes more frequent due to lower transaction costs, especially information and measurement costs. A standard approach to modelling multi-player contracting is provided by the incomplete contracting literature which we refer to as property rights theory (PRT), originated by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) . PRT has been successful, but also has limitations (see Whinston, 2003; Williamson, 2002) . This paper points out the PRT limitations and presents an alternative model which remedies the limitations while preserving the successful sides.
A three period N-player game is considered. In the first period, ex ante, the contract specifying surplus sharing is signed. In the second period, irreversible investment into production occurs. The ex ante contract can be altered ex post. Hence, in the third period, ex post, the players extend resources to alter surplus sharing. This determines ex post ownership of surplus endogenously. The third period actions impact transaction costs.
We distinguish between productive investments and actions to alter surplus sharing since this distinction is common within most firms, for example in terms of competence among employees and budgetary allocations. It is thus natural that these are two different free choice variables. Absent costly actions the model is equivalent to a standard moral hazard in teams model (Holmstrøm, 1979) . The trade-offs in such a model are well known. Allocating a player a greater share of the surplus will increase his investment incentives and will increase total surplus, which may benefit other players. Absent investments, the model with just costly actions is equivalent to a standard rent-seeking model (Tullock, 1980; Skaperdas, 1996) which also has well-known properties.
After production in the second period, the players in the third period choose actions which can be interpreted as rent-seeking. See Tullock (1980) for an early formulation when the rent is fixed, Hausken (2005) for production and rent seeking, Murphy et al. (1993) for why rent seeking is costly to growth, and Muthoo (2004) for the emergence of secure property rights through production and rent seeking. Further, Hacket (1994) and Oosterbeek et al. (2003) find that players who invest relatively more tend to receive larger shares of ex post surplus, and Hausken and Schwartz (2011) model the transactional environment as a separate function, rather than merely as a constraint. This paper proceeds beyond this literature by considering the third rent seeking period as an alteration of an ex ante contract determined in the first period. Our analysis employs specific and credible functional forms to generate analytic solutions and numerical simulations that illuminate the players' decisions. In return for the sacrifice of generality, a successful specification demonstrates that at least the minimal standard of internal consistency has been achieved.
PRT focuses on how asset ownership affects ex post bargaining, which means that ex ante contracts are not enforceable ex post. More specifically, PRT assumes that no ex ante contracts that specify individual shares contingent on efforts or investments are enforceable ex post. In contrast, we do not focus on how asset ownership affects ex post bargaining. Instead, we assume that ex ante contracts are signed, but can be altered ex post if transaction costs are incurred. This means that we replace bargaining in PRT with costly conflict over the surplus. This focus ties the model to the literature of ex post rent seeking within organisations (Hausken, 2005; Inderst et al., 2007) and to ex post influence activities in Williamson's (2002) transaction cost theory of the firm which we thus formalise. That is, the model can be perceived as a model of influence costs where the players lobby ex post for greater shares of their jointly produced surplus.
The players choose an intermediate range between no and full contracting powers, in the following sense. If the players choose actions which do not incur transaction costs, ex post and ex ante contracts are equivalent. If the players choose the same actions, ex post and ex ante shares are equivalent. However, if one player chooses a larger action than another player, the first player earns a larger ex post share than his ex ante share, which has to be weighed against his increased transaction costs, and the change in investments which impact production. The role of ownership is that the players own their ex ante shares until the third period actions alter their ex post ownership.
The model allows specifying an upper limit for transaction costs. When transaction costs exceed the limit, the transaction will not be conducted, neither in the market nor within firms, which means that firms cannot be formed (non-integration). The model thus specifies one essential ingredient that is needed for firms to exist.
We account for two characteristics of existing business contracts. The first is that ex ante contracts between the players specify only the shares of joint production. One example is sharecropping contracts in the agricultural sector which determine the division of product between tenants and landlords according to some predetermined share-out.
1
On the one hand, this reflects that players often have limited capabilities of elaborate ex ante contracting, and on the other hand reflects that agreements specifying how joint production is shared is often a routine contractual practice. The second is ex post adjustment of ex ante agreement, which is also common in contractual interactions. See Klein (1985) for an account of the flexibility present in contracts that govern real world business relationships, where ex post adjustment is often easy to the extent that possible contingencies that may arise ex post may have limited ex ante allocative significance. See Reuer et al. (2002) for the occurrence and determinants of post-formation governance changes in strategic alliances, including alterations in alliances' contracts, boards or oversight committees, and monitoring mechanisms. We account for the cost to the players of verifying and enforcing their contracts ex post.
Transaction costs consist of legal, political, and bureaucratic costs, penalty costs for breach of ex ante contract, costs of appropriating surplus, and costs of defending against the surplus being appropriated. North (1990) classifies these transaction costs as measurement, information and enforcement costs.
PRT makes four assumptions:
1 ex ante contracts are not enforceable ex post 2 ex ante the players can give and accept lump-sum transfers 3 the players engage in ex post Nash bargaining 4 players have ex post 'outside options', which differ with ownership structure.
Let us elaborate upon these four assumptions. From assumption 1, ex ante contracts do not exist. Typically, in assumption 2, the principal(s) maximise(s) expected utility by choosing a contract which determines the optimal size of a lump-sum transfer which enables extracting the highest profit from agent(s), subject to individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints.
2 Ex ante the principal (or one of the principals) chooses the ownership structure to maximise his profit. In assumption 3, Nash bargaining exogenously determines the players' ex post shares of the net surplus (i.e., the surplus net of ex post outside options). Nevertheless, the players' actual ownership allocations (i.e., their sharing of the joint surplus) are affected by their investment choices. As stated in assumption 4, investment choices may alter players' 'outside options'. From assumptions 3 and 4, only joint surplus net of player 'outside options' is subject to ex post Nash bargaining. Using these four assumptions, PRT investigates the players' optimal organisational structure and production, and compares these choices with the socially optimal allocation.
Interestingly, Hart (1995, p.39, footnote 17) writes that "the bargaining process is assumed to be independent of ownership structure. This may seem a strong assumption. In fact, I would argue that it is a weak assumption". In PRT, the bargaining process is unaffected by integration (i.e., by the choice of ownership structure). Despite this assumption, in PRT, the actual ex post surplus sharing differs with integration regime due to the presence of ex post outside options, which are indeed affected by integration. This dependence of ex post outside options on the integration regime makes bargaining indirectly affected by the integration regime, because in different regimes of integration players bargain over the net surplus. This indirect dependence makes the assumption that the bargaining process is unaffected by integration innocuous, as Hart (1995) correctly points out. The fact that the assumption is indeed weak causes a problem for PRT because of difficulties of intuitive interpretation of the results and because of technical complexities of dealing with ex post outside options. This paper abandons PRT assumption 3. Instead, we suggest that the bargaining process may differ with integration regime. While we do not model player bargaining directly, the players' bargaining capabilities are reflected by their contractual constants. The role of ex post contractual costs in our model is similar to the role of ex post outside options in PRT. Naturally, these costs depend on the integration regime and many other factors. In our model, the procedure of surplus division is more flexible than in PRT, because we consider ex ante contracts that stipulate surplus sharing other than Nash bargaining and allow costly ex post modification of ex ante contract. This stands in contrast to PRT where firm organisation and technology are driven by ex ante efficiency. Our paper replaces the four PRT assumptions with three alternative assumptions, applicable for contracts in general, and in particular for incomplete, and poorly enforceable ex ante contracts. a only a primitive ex ante contract specifying player shares is viable b player investments are irreversible c ex ante contract could be altered ex post at exogenous cost(s).
Assumption 1 is altered so that the players can sign a simple ex ante contract. Assumption 2 is altered so that our players cannot give and accept ex ante lump sum transfers. But, the case with lump sum transfers is equivalent to the social planner benchmark studied in Section 4. Assumptions 3 and 4 are altered so that we do not model the players' ex post interaction(s) as Nash bargaining. Furthermore, our players do not have 'ex post outside options'. Unlike in our model, in PRT player investments are partially reversible due to the presence of outside options (assumption 4). Instead of assumptions 2 to 4, we assume in assumption b that investments are fully irreversible. Furthermore, in assumption c our players can allocate resources to alter ex ante contract ex post, which constitutes costly contracting.
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Many possibilities exist for determining ex ante sharing. We do not think a general method can be provided for determining ex ante sharing, and leave it to future research to explore the many possibilities. Any method chosen is compatible with this paper's model as long as ex ante sharing is somehow determined. In this paper, we consider two methods. We consider one game where ex ante sharing is chosen by one of the players, and one game where ex ante sharing is chosen by the social planner. The first game is realistic in markets with one dominant player, 4 or in markets where the players are willing to let one player choose the ex ante sharing. The second game is realistic in markets where law, contract, culture, or custom dictate that some external actor or random choice shall specify ex ante sharing. Further methods that can be explored in future research are to let ex ante sharing be chosen by bargaining, e.g., Nash bargaining, or by various characteristics of the players, the environment, the production method, the product, or the user of the product.
Summing up, we argue that a model with the combination of investments and costly actions yield realism that investments or costly actions alone would not. First, accounting only for investments reduces the model to one which does not allow accounting for the emergence of unforeseen contingencies and how players adapt to these (Klein, 1985) . Second, accounting only for costly actions reduces the model to a rent seeking model which exogenises the rent and thus cannot account for production and investment.
Section 2 develops the model. Section 3 presents the analysis. Section 4 compares the games where ex ante sharing is chosen by a specific player, with a benchmark where ex ante sharing is chosen by a social planner. Section 5 concludes.
The model
We consider a three period N-player game. In the first period, ex ante, the players sign a contract which specifies how their joint production shall be shared. Player i is allocated a share x i , 0 ≤ x i ≤ 1, i = 1, 2,…,N, determined by player 1 without loss of generality, where 1 1,
which assures that the entire surplus is divided between the players. In the second period, player i invests q i ≥ 0 irreversibly, q = (q 1 ,…,q N ), which gives production R(q). In the third period, each player chooses an action r i ≥ 0, and incurs a cost B i (r i ), ∂B i / ∂r i > 0, to alter the ex ante contract in his favour. This means that each player i has two choice variables q i and r i . Additionally, the x i 's, which sum to one, have to be determined in the first period. Ex post sharing is determined by
where t = (t 1 ,…,t N ), x = (x 1 ,…,x N ), r = (r 1 ,…,r N ), 1 1.
The action r i reflects player i's impact on ex post contract adjustment. For intuition of (1) assume that each player hires a lawyer. Let r be the number of hours the lawyer spends for the player. The more hours the lawyer spends, the more ways he will find to increase the player's ex post surplus share t i . To illustrate (1), notice that in a two player game it becomes
If r 1 = r 2 , the players' ex ante shares remain intact: t i = x i . When r 1 > r 2 , player 1's ex post share exceeds his ex ante share, and conversely for player 2. In the N-player game, the ex ante share of a player i whose action equals the average action of the N players remains unchanged so that t i = x i . 5 The relative sizes of the r i 's determine which players gain and lose as a result of the ex post share adjustment.
The action r i is costly for each player and impacts the transaction cost function B i (r i ), which reflects measurement costs, information costs and enforcement costs involved in "defining, protecting and enforcing property rights for goods" [North, (1990) , p.28]. North (1990) argues that any joint production entails two types of costs -transformation costs and transaction costs. In our model, q i is the production investment, and w i q i is the production cost, where w i is the unit cost of investment. Further, r i is the transaction action, and B i (r i ) is the transaction cost.
Player i's objective is to maximise his profit, which equals his ex post share of the production net of production cost and transaction cost:
and w i > 0 is player i's unit investment cost. We consider the convexly increasing transaction cost function
where γ i > 0 is a player specific transaction cost parameter which implies
As γ i increases from 0 to ∞, B i decreases convexly from ∞ to 0. Equation (4) implies that r i = 0, i = 1,…,N causes zero transaction costs which according to and (1) expresses full commitment to ex ante sharing, i.e., t i = x i . We consider the generalised Cobb-Douglas production function
where α ∈ (0, 1), λ > 0 is a parameter, and h i ∈ (0, 1 / 2) is a player specific productivity parameter for player i which implies
In economics, Cobb-Douglas or CES production functions, although involving special assumptions about the functional relations between inputs and outputs, have proved to be extremely useful for advancing our understanding of productive processes and economic growth. Applying credible specific functional forms allows us to produce exact analytical solutions for the variables, illustrated with numerical simulations. In return for the sacrifice of generality, a successful specification demonstrates that at least the minimal standard of internal consistency has been achieved. In addition, we claim, the particular functional forms used here will be illuminating. Using particular functional forms makes it possible to determine ranges of parameter values, for example for when one player earns a larger ex post share than another player, and when a player enjoys a larger share with than without a social planner.
Solving the model
Inserting equations (1), (4) and (5) into (3) gives player i's profit:
First, we solve the third period. This means solving for equilibrium actions r in the subgame that starts after ex ante shares x have been determined in the first period and investments q have been sunk in the second period. Assume that x and q are given. Differentiating the profit with respect to r i for player i, and setting the derivative equal to zero gives
which is solved to yield the optimal response r i = r i (x, q): (·, q) . Player i's optimal action increases in his transaction cost parameter γ i and the joint production R. The higher the production R, the higher the transaction cost each player is willing to incur. γ i = 1 / R implies r i = 0 (full commitment to the ex ante contract). Positive actions r i ≥ 0 imply γ i ≥ 1 / R which expresses lower limits to the transaction cost parameters. Inserting (8) and (4) into (3) gives the equilibrium profit for the sub-game that starts after (x, q):
.
Next, we solve the second period. Assume that x is fixed. In Appendix A, we prove Lemma 1, which states that for any fixed x; there exists a unique optimal q i (x) when h i ∈ (0, 1 / 2). Inserting into (8) gives unique optimal transaction actions r i (x) = r i (x, q(x)), and inserting into (1) gives unique optimal ex post sharing t i (x) = t i (x, q(x)). This proves that unique t i (x), q i (x), r i (x) exist. This uniqueness result allows us to define the functions q i (t) = q i (t(x)) and r i (t) = r i (t(x)), where t(x) denotes a function reciprocal to x(t). Hence, we use t as independent variable instead of x. Assume that t is fixed. Differentiating the profit in (9) with respect to q i to find optimal q i = q i (t), and setting the derivative equal to zero gives
Solving, and applying 1 1,
and ( )
which is inserted into (5) and (11) to yield ( )
The transaction actions r(t) and ex ante sharing x(t) follow from inserting (13) into (8) and (1). The profits Π i (t) follow from inserting (13) and (11) into (9). Player 1's profit is ( )
Equation (14) shows that player 1 prefers t k > γ k for all k = 2,…,N, but does not prefer 
Summing up gives 
Inserting t 1 into (16) gives player k's ex post share 1 1 , 2 , , .
From (18) and (19) we require (20), the intuitive result follows that the transaction will not be conducted, neither in the market nor within firms, which means that firms cannot be formed (non-integration). The model thus allows the full range of transaction costs from 0 to an upper limit. Using r i = γ i Ln(γ i R) in (13), lower and upper limits for γ i imply lower and upper limits for the action r i . The lower limit is r i = 0. The upper limit is given by (20) . As an example, in the symmetric case γ i = 1 / N for all i = 1,…,N, the upper limit is r i = Ln(R / N) / N. When γ i = 1 and γ k = 0 for all k ≠ i, the upper limit is r i = Ln(R) for player i and r i = 0 for player k. Inserting (18) and (19) into (13) gives the production R and the players' second period investments q i , inserting into (8) gives the players' third period actions r i , and inserting into (9) gives the players' profit Π i .
Property 1:
The inequality ( )
specifies when player 1 earns a larger ex post share than player k.
Proof: Follows from (18) and (19).
Player i's ex post share t i increases in the productivity parameter h i and the transaction cost parameter γ i . Increasing γ i benefits player i in a double sense. First, it decreases transaction costs B i according to (4). Second, it increases player i's share t i according to (18) and (19) . Each player's ex post share increases in his transaction cost parameter, and decreases if all transaction cost parameters are high. Player 1's share t 1 decreases in α while player k's share t k increases in α. Hence, all players prefer large h i and γ i , while player 1 prefers a low α and player k prefers a high α. As an example, the limit α = 0 causes t k = γ k and zero investment q k = 0 by player k, and thus also zero production and profit. As α increases above 0, player k's share increases above γ k , and player 1's share decreases below its maximum. At the other extreme, with α → 1 and γ 1 = γ k , (21) simplifies to t 1 ≤ t k ⇔ h 1 ≤ h k , which means that player k enjoys a higher share than player 1 when equipped with a superior productivity parameter h k . When h 1 = h k , the rightmost inequality in (21) becomes α ≤ 1 which is always satisfied. When additionally γ 1 = γ k , player 1 always earns a larger share than player k, a share that increases to 1 as α decreases from 1 to 0. . Player 1's ex post share is larger than player k's ex post share, increasing and decreasing respectively. Both players' profits and investments, and the production, decrease. x i and r i cannot be negative, so we plot γ 1 from 0.06 to 0.43. When γ 1 = γ k = 0.1, the players choose the same third period actions and incur the same transaction costs, which imply equal ex post and ex ante shares t 1 = x 1 and t k = x k . When γ 1 < γ k then r 1 < r k which implies t 1 < x 1 , t k > x k .
A social planner benchmark
This section compares with a benchmark -a social planner whose objective is to maximise the net social surplus S conventionally defined as the aggregate surplus R(t) net of aggregate production costs 1 ( ).
The social planner chooses only the ex ante allocation, i.e., the first period actions, and not the second and the third period player actions. Using (13) gives 
The right hand side is independent of k, and hence we can write
which is inserted into
which means that t i -γ i has the same value for all players. Inserting (25) into (13) gives the production R and the players' second period investments q i , inserting into (8) gives the players' third period actions r i , and inserting into (9) gives the players' profit Π i .
Property 2:
The social planner introduces more equality between the players in the sense that ex post shares depend on neither h i nor α, but do depend on each player's transaction cost parameter γ i since transaction costs cannot be eliminated. Player 1 enjoys a larger share with than without the social planner when ( )
Player k enjoys a larger share with than without the social planner when 1 1 1 , 2, , . Proof: Follows from comparing (25) with (18) and (19).
All players enjoy a larger share with than without the social planner when their productivity parameter h i is low, but this requirement is more restrictive for player 1 than for player k when α < 1. For the extreme case α → 1, both (26) and (27) simplify to h i ≤ 1 / N, i = 2,…,N, which means that player i enjoys a larger share with than without the social planner when h i is lower than the average productivity parameter of all players when all productivity parameters are equal. As α decreases below 1, player 1 must suffer an even lower productivity parameter than 1 / N to enjoy a larger share with than without the social planner, and never enjoys a larger share with than without the social planner when α < 1 -1 / N, while player k enjoys a larger share with than without the social planner even with a productivity parameter somewhat larger than 1 / N provided that (27) is satisfied. The social planner does not cause equality with respect to transaction costs. As without a social planner, each player's ex post share increases in his transaction cost parameter, and decreases if all transaction cost parameters are high. Figure 2 shows the solution with a social planner and N = 3 players as a function of γ 1 with the same parameter values as in Figure 1 . Subscript s signifies social planner. The production R is higher than in Figure 1 . Player 1 earns a lower profit and invests less than in Figure 1 , while player 2 earns a higher profit and invests more. Player 1's ex post share is lower than player 2's ex post share when γ 1 < 0.1 = γ 2 , and is otherwise higher. The admissible range of γ 1 is 0.05 to 0.31.
Conclusions
This paper studies contracting between players who produce jointly and share their surplus. We characterise PRT which has been successful but has limitations, and present what we consider to be a superior theory. PRT assumes that 1 ex ante contracts are not enforceable ex post 2 ex ante the players can give and accept lump-sum transfers 3 the players engage in ex post Nash bargaining 4 players have ex post 'outside options', which differ with ownership structure.
In contrast, we assume that a only a primitive ex ante contract specifying player shares is viable b player investments are irreversible c ex ante contract could be altered ex post at exogenous cost(s).
Ex ante contracts are signed, but can be altered ex post if transaction costs are incurred. The players own their ex ante shares until the third period actions alter their ex post ownership. The model specifies an upper limit for transaction costs. Costs below the limit are needed for firms to exist. The model constitutes a model of influence costs where the players lobby ex post for greater shares of their jointly produced surplus. We account for two characteristics of contracts. The first is that ex ante contracts between the players specify only the shares of joint production. The second is ex post adjustment of ex ante agreement. Furthermore, surplus sharing agreed upon ex ante can be altered ex post after irreversible investment into production. Costs of altering ownership allocation are player specific. We investigate the effects of player transaction costs on investments and allocational efficiency. We allow costly ex post modification of ex ante contract, in contrast to classical PRT where firm organisation and technology are driven by ex ante efficiency.
A three period N-player game is considered with the generalised Cobb-Douglas production function and a transaction cost function which increases convexly in action, and decreases convexly in a player specific transaction cost parameter. Ex ante, in the first period, the players sign a contract specifying surplus sharing. In the second period the players invest irreversibly into production. Ex post, in the third period, the players choose actions which incur transaction costs to determine ex post ownership of surplus endogenously. Assuming without loss of generality that player 1 proposes the ex ante contract for all players that is optimal for him, which is realistic in markets with one dominant player, we determine the optimal ex post contract. All players' ex post shares increase in their player specific productivity parameter and transaction cost parameter, and decrease if all transaction cost parameters are high. Player 1's share decreases in α, while the other players' shares increase in α. Player 1 usually benefits from proposing the ex ante contract, but a high α enables any player with a sufficiently high productivity parameter to enjoy a higher ex post share than player 1.
Introducing a social planner causes more equality between the players. Their ex post shares depend neither on their productivity parameters nor α, but do depend on each player's transaction cost parameter since transaction costs cannot be eliminated.
Future research can generalise the assumption that ex ante contractibility is confined to share vectors, thus accounting for linear or contingent ex ante contracts. Future research can also relax the assumption that the dominant player cannot extract side-payments from the other players.
Notes

1
The tenant's share of output has been observed to be as low as 20% in Southern India [Tomlinson, (1996) , p.81] or as high as 80% in Argentina in the 1890s [Adelman, (1994) , p.137]. 2 Grossman and Hart (1983) discuss the conditions under which such an optimisation is well-defined. 3 Whereas in PRT assumptions 1 to 4 some players do not receive quasi-rents (for example, when ex ante the market for agents is perfectly competitive, they earn zero quasi-rents), with assumptions a to c all players could earn positive quasi-rents. 4
Apple in the i-phone or i-pod markets (Linden et al., 2007) . 5
For the special case in which the r i 's are identical for all the N players, ex ante and ex post shares are identical for all players too. Also, if player i's r i is highest (lowest) among the N players, his ex post share increases (decreases) relative to his ex ante share.
Appendix A
Proof of unique equilibrium
Lemma 1: Let h i ∈ (0, 1 / 2). Then, for each player, there exists a unique equilibrium in the sub-game that starts from any fixed x.
Proof: Assume that t i (q, r) is strictly montonic in q and r, ∂t i (q, r) / ∂q i > 0 and ∂t i (q, r) / ∂r i > 0, which is realistic since both increasing investment q i and increasing action r i inevitably cause a larger ex post share t i . First, recall from (8) that for a given (x, q), there exists a unique optimal r = r(x, q), where r i (x, q) depends on R = R(q) only as r i (x, q) = r i (·, q). Thus, for any fixed x, t i (x, q) = x i + r i (·, q), which means that player i's objective function can be expressed as a function of q only, which implies ( , ) ( , ) . sufficiently large production R (which causes costly action r i by all players) and not too large transaction cost parameters γ i summed over all players (which excludes investment q i by at least one player), gives an interior solution. Many combinations exist for how these requirements for γ i prevent an interior solution. Solving each combination requires space similar to Section 3, so let us proceed as follows. The third period is solved first.
First, if γ i < 1 / R ∀i, then r i = 0 ∀i which is inserted into (1) to yield t i = x i ∀i, causing a pure investment model without costly action (third period eliminated). Inserting (1), (4) and (5) (1 ) ( )
. 
